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Introduction 
According to Samuel Huntington,
1
 the post-Cold War era would not experience the universal 
triumph of liberal democracy and capitalism as predicted by Francis Fukuyama.
2
 Rather, 
cultural and political differences inherent in the international system of nations would reassert 
the significance of the nation-state after forty years of geopolitical domination. In Uzbekistan, 
the relationship between nation-building and state-building in the post-Soviet era illuminates 
the significance of the nation-state in the post-Cold War era. After centuries of portrayal as 
Russia’s backyard, the emergence of the five predominantly unexplored Central Asian 
republics in 1991 in itself represented a source of considerable interest for Western scholars. 
However, rather than sharing a similar outlook and pursuing similar goals, the republics of 
Central Asia experienced individual trajectories. In Uzbekistan, the political culture of the 
Soviet authority survived to play a predominant role in the independence era. With the 
requirement of national construction coinciding with a lust for political survival, the regime 
of Islam Karimov, the last leader of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan the first President of 
independent Uzbekistan, sought to forge a link between state and society within the context 
of the ‘nation’ which would not only satisfy nation-building demands, but also strengthen the 
position and capacity of the state during an unprecedented period.  
The role of Islam represents a key component of the nexus between nation-building and the 
strengthening of the state in the post-Soviet era. With the emergence of the Islamic revival in 
the late 1980s, the Karimov regime considered ‘religious legitimacy’ as a necessary means to 
political legitimacy. However, the ‘official’ revival of Islam was limited to a particular form 
of Islam that did not threaten the status quo. Instead of facilitating an outright resurgence of 
Islam in the country, the state promoted Sufism - a central aspect of ‘national heritage’ - in 
order to demonstrate the regime’s commitment to national identity and independence while 
simultaneously legitimising the political authority to the citizenry.   
The aim of this thesis is to explore and evaluate the significance of religion in the interrelated 
processes of nation-building and state-building, and the consolidation of power in Uzbekistan 
in the decade after independence. In examining such aspects of the interplay between 
ideology and power in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, this study draws from a range of primary and 
secondary sources. Much of the primary literature, published in Uzbek and English, 
                                                          
1
 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilisations?’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49. 
2
 Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History’, The National Interest, Summer 1989, pp. 3-18. 
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illuminates myriad aspects of state policy in relation to education, religion, the constitution, 
and security. The sources in Uzbek, officially translated, serve to disseminate crucial policy 
information pertaining to state policy in the context of the nation-building and state-building 
processes. They also provide some revealing insights from important political figures who 
experienced the political environment in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. The sources in English 
predominantly contain reports of important speeches and interviews carried out by Western 
organisations. The works of major political and socialist theorists also play an important role, 
providing a deeper engagement with the foundational concepts crucial to this work.  As this 
study represents a multi-conceptual case that covers universal themes pertaining to nations 
and nationalism, it also draws on an expansive range of secondary literature in order to 
explore the interrelationship between the various ideas and concepts at play. In particular, 
modernist scholars of nationalism, such as Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, and Benedict 
Anderson are especially significant, due to their interpretation of the nation as a modern 
construct by the state. Importantly, for Gellner, ‘nationalism is primarily a political principle 
that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’.3 In independent 
Uzbekistan, the congruency of the ‘political and the national unit’ symbolises the inter-
relationship between nation and state-building, while their connection with political 
legitimacy serves to reflect the appeal of nationalism for ruling elites. Overall, the 
combination of primary and secondary literature enables two goals: A close investigation and 
evaluation of political strategy and religion in the case of Uzbekistan, and prevailing insights 
regarding the political and cultural challenges in the post-Soviet space.     
In this study, Chapter 1 provides a conceptual framework concerning the nexus between 
nation-building and state-building through religion, and how this relates to the end goal of 
political survival. Chapter 2 focuses on the religious and political history of Uzbekistan, 
especially of the Soviet era, in order to understand the underpinning forces of the nation and 
state-building processes. Chapter 3 will examine the role of religion during the nation-
building process and how it was manifested in the areas of education, literature, and symbols, 
with its aim to achieve a homogenous community. Chapter 4 displays the link between 
nation-building and state-building by demonstrating the state’s growing potency during the 
period of national construction. This is relevant in order to understand the importance of 
legitimacy for the state in the post-Soviet era. Finally, Chapter 5 analyses the state’s power 
                                                          
3
 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Malden, Oxford, 1983, p. 1. 
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obtained through the nation-building and state-building processes by examining its struggle 
with Islamic extremism and its ability to frame ‘enemies’ of the ‘nation’.  
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Chapter 1 –  Nation-Building, State-Building, and the Role of Religion: 
Developing a Conceptual Framework 
 
Nation-building and state-building: 
Nation-building and state-building represent two overlapping but conceptually different 
processes. While nation-building is largely concerned with forging a common national 
identity, state-building usually entails the establishment of state institutions and legal 
systems.
4
  One of the most renowned distinctions between nation and state-building was 
illustrated by Massimo D’Azeglio, one of the leaders of the Italian Risorgimento movement, 
when he stated ‘‘we have made Italy; now we must make Italians’’.5 In terms of basic 
characteristics, a nation does not contain defined roles, institutional structures, officials, or 
coercive powers.
6
 Likewise, the state does not naturally possess the culture and identity that 
is inherently part of the nation. The conceptual distinctions between nation-building and 
state-building underscore their overlapping nature. Without the state, the nation will struggle 
to gain the necessary infrastructure and resources in order to properly develop. On the other 
hand, without the support of the nation, the state’s ability to obtain the legitimacy of rule is 
drastically compromised. Moreover, the state-building agenda is often reflected in the 
national arena. According to Taras Kuzio, ‘‘the state may create institutions, such as a 
Ministry of Education, but the curricula it will direct schools and higher education to teach 
will be reflected in the nation-building priorities of the state leadership.’’7  Thus, while 
nation-building and state-building are conceptually distinct, they are also symbiotic and 
complementary processes.   
Nation-building as a policy of state-building represents a crucial component of the 
interrelationship between the two processes. Although the idea of the nation as a ‘live, 
organic, natural entity’8 has been referenced in order to convey the contrast between nations 
and states, modernist scholars of nations and nationalism such as Gellner, Hobsbawm, and 
Anderson share a consensus that the nation portrays a social construct by the political 
                                                          
4
 Grigol Ubiria, Soviet Nation-Building in Central Asia, The making of the Kazakh and Uzbek Nations, New York: 
Routledge 2016 
5
 Ibid, p. 19. 
6
 Juan J. Linz, ‘State-Building and Nation-Building’, European Review, Vol. 1 Issue 4, pp. 355-369.  
7
 In Ubiria, Soviet Nation-Building in Central Asia, p. 19. 
8
 Linz, ‘State-Building and Nation-Building’.  
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authority. For Hobsbawm, nations are a product of ‘‘social engineering’’ which often 
coincided with the coming to power or consolidation of power of elites.
9
 Gellner argued that 
the awakening of the nation emerged with the imposition of a ‘high culture’ that reflected the 
desires of the state to create a common identity and homogenised culture.
10
 Meanwhile, for 
Anderson, print capitalism represented a vital tool in disseminating ideas concerning ‘the 
nation’, while such ideas were proliferated by languages of power and authority, symbolising 
the resources of the state.
11
  The idea of the nation as a modern construct by political elites 
represents an essential component of the relationship between nation-building and state-
building. According to Grigol Ubiria, ‘nation-making implies top-down strategies of elites 
aimed to create a single coherent national community out of previously loosely-linked 
particular ethnic/regional communities and social strata’.12  The ‘top-down strategy of elites’ 
and the creation of ‘a single coherent national community’ demonstrate the authority of the 
state vis a vis nation-building and the significance of ‘national’ support to its rule. After 
establishing a nation, the state is required to embrace popular and national appeals in order to 
obtain political legitimacy. According to French theorist Ernest Renan, ‘A nation’s existence 
is a daily plebiscite’.13 In other words, nation, nationhood, and national identity are not 
everlasting natural phenomena; rather they require sustainability on a daily basis through 
nation-maintaining policies. Such policies often include official language policy, re-writing 
national history, and the promotion of national culture through symbols, images and rituals. 
For political regimes, the appeal of national independence and belonging has proven highly 
conducive towards the pursuit of legitimacy and political consolidation. 
Religion and ‘the nation’:  
In recent times, especially in the West, religion in the doctrinal sense has been used to 
illustrate that religion is incompatible with modernity and progress. However, religion can be 
explained as a culture and way of life that lies at the foundations of a cultural identity, 
regardless of one’s own theological commitments or attachment to the institutional church. 
According to the American Anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, religion depicts a cultural system 
where symbols contain an overarching influence. Geertz understands religion as a ‘(1) system 
of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long lasting moods and 
                                                          
9
 In Zenonas Norkus, ‘Max Weber on Nations and Nationalism: Political Economy before Political Sociology’, 
The Canadian Journal of Sociology, Volume 29 (3), Summer 2004, p. 409.  
10
 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983, p. 57.  
11
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London-New York: Verso, 2006.  
12
 Ubiria, Soviet Nation-Building in Central Asia, p. 16. 
13
. Ernest Renan, ‘What is a Nation’ (Ou'est-ce qu'une nation?), Lecture at Sorbonne, 11 March 1882. 
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motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) 
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivation 
seem uniquely realistic.
14
  The essential bedrock of Geertz’s argument is that religion as a 
cultural system serves to define the collective meaning of religion opposed to one’s inner 
experiences. The symbols that Geertz refers to can be people, pictures, objects, actions, 
events, or relationships. Such symbols perform to interpret the world in a particular way, 
shape experiences, tell us how we live or how we ought to live, while they communicate 
meaning about certain ideals, values, and ways of living.
15
  Overall, religion as a cultural 
system does not require an individual religious belief or experience to function accordingly.  
By defining religion as a cultural force, it is assumed that religion serves to identify a 
particular culture or ethnicity. In the modern era, this identity often takes the form of the 
nation. In Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s conception of ‘civic religion’, two kinds of religion exist 
within society – religion of the man and of the citizen. The latter, which reflects the national 
context, ‘is codified in a single country, to which it gives its own patron saints, it has 
dogmas’, while ‘it doesn’t regard the duties and rights of man as extending far beyond its 
own altars’.16 For Rousseau, religion of the citizen also makes the country the object of the 
citizens’ adoration, teaching them that ‘service done to the state is service done to its 
guardian God’, while a violation of laws can be interpreted as desecration.17 Examining 
Rousseau’s interpretation of civic religion, it is clear that he views the state as the ultimate 
authority in defining ‘national’ boundaries. In this regard, religion as a crucial component of 
national identity also lends itself to nationalism. Although scholars such as Anderson and 
Gellner neglected religion or saw it as being replaced by nationalism, religion continues to 
represent a seminal relationship with the nation which has been promoted by states for 
legitimacy purposes. As religion can define boundaries between certain groups, the 
promotion of religion as the foundation of national culture has proven a strategic tool for 
political elites to unite certain groups while simultaneously framing others as ‘enemies’ of the 
‘nation’. Religious language and imagery have often been adopted to portray the special 
character of a nation, while religious myths and symbols iconic of a particular nation have 
served to unite the political authority with ‘the people’ in the framework of ‘the nation’. 
                                                          
14
 Clifford Geertz, ‘Religion as a Cultural System’, in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: 
Basic Books, 1973, p. 90-91.  
15
 Geertz, ‘Religion as a Cultural System’.  
16
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, December 2010, p. 70.  
17
 Ibid, p. 70.  
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Thus, religion, as a cultural phenomenon, can represent a strategic tool for ruling elites to 
harness ‘religious legitimacy’ as a platform for political support.  
Political Survival - the End of the Means? 
The notion of political survival often represents a crucial component of state-building. In this 
context, political survival is integrated in terms of the leader’s primary goal of maintaining 
and controlling power, which can be achieved through nationalist appeal and thereafter state 
strengthening. The promotion of nationalism for political purposes often arises when a 
country is experiencing anocracy -  a regime that is defined by inherent instability, usually 
with an inconsistent combination of democratic and authoritarian tendencies. The flexibility 
between democratic and authoritarian tendencies, coupled with the presence of weak 
institutions, enables the regime to control the nation-building narrative and subjugate political 
opposition. According to V. P. Gagnon, elites must express their interests in the language of 
the collective interest, as the support of the masses maximises political support and 
undermines opponents, with the language of the collective interest often accentuating the 
nation and national culture.
18
 With legitimacy obtained from the nation-building process 
alongside the consolidation of power through state-building processes of institutional and 
legal framework creation, the survival of the current regime becomes imperative; without it a 
political vacuum would ensue, thereby threatening the nation-building process. Furthermore, 
the legitimacy of the regime and its control of vital resources, such as media, enables the state 
to frame ‘enemies’. This notion of the state’s control of threat perception falls into Ole 
Waever’s conception of securitization. For Waever, security represents a state construction, 
thereby enabling it to pursue legitimate strategies.
19
  By addressing an issue in primarily 
security terms, the state is automatically allocated a central position in addressing it.
20
 
Nation-building and state-building, engendering political legitimacy and consolidation of 
power respectively, can represent crucial processes in determining the survival of a regime.  
Overall, the conceptual framework established in this chapter has focused primarily on the 
concepts of nation-building and state-building and their relationship with political survival, 
focusing on the role of religion in these processes. It is important to note that, while such 
seminal concepts underpin political strategy in post-independence Uzbekistan, other cognate 
                                                          
18
 V.P Gagnon, ‘Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia’, International Security, Vol 19 
Issue 3, Winter 1994-1995, pp. 130-166. 
19
 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, On Security, New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.  
20
 Ibid. 
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and derivative concepts will be considered also, where appropriate, throughout the remaining 
chapters. In the following chapter, the historical significance of Islam in Uzbekistan will be 
discussed in order to demonstrate the influence of religion in the post-independence era. 
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Chapter 2 – Islam and Uzbekistan: Historical Context 
The official revival of Islam after 1991 is largely responsible for the re-emerging interest in 
the historical relevance of Islam in Uzbekistan. Islam represents a prolonged history in 
Uzbekistan and it is by far the most dominant religion, accounting for around 90%
21
 of its 
population of over 32 million people.
22
 The arrival of the Arabs to Central Asia in the 8
th
 
century marked the inception of Islam in Uzbekistan, while the Uzbek capital Tashkent 
houses the world’s oldest Koran. Significantly, Sufi Islam - characteristically introspective 
and non-political – plays a predominant role in the lives of many Uzbek Muslims.23 One of 
the world’s largest and oldest Sufi order, the Naqshbandiyaa, was founded in the ancient 
Uzbek city of Bukhara in the 11
th
 century.
24
  Throughout history, Islam has represented a 
significant identity for Central Asians, distinguishing them from foreign tribes and forces. In 
the 19
th
 century, much opposition to Russian colonialism was mobilised through Islamic 
identity, despite its ultimate submission to Russia’s strength. Ironically, the significance of 
Islam in Uzbekistan would be underscored by the official policy of the Soviet Union vis a vis 
religion. With the subjugation and persecution of Islam during the Soviet period, the revival 
of Islam in the independence era would receive much of its energy from the sense of 
victimization experienced during the colonial period.   
Sufism and its relationship with Uzbekistan: 
Sufism represents a dominant symbol of Islam in Uzbekistan, and its historical relationship 
with the nation has proved critical in the post-Soviet era. Sufism can be described as the 
mystical dimension of Islam which developed out of an ascetic trend in early Islam that 
emphasised detachment from the real world, concerning itself mainly with the relation of the 
soul to the Divine.
25
 The underlying characteristics of Sufism have represented a strong 
source of appeal in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. In Sufism, individualism and detachment from 
the material world and their interrelationship represent two core characteristics which 
provided Sufism with political appeal. Such characteristics have asserted the notion that 
Sufism depicts a liberal religion.  Jose Casanova posits that in the liberal conception religion 
                                                          
21
 Global Security, Uzbekistan – Religion.  
22
 The Government Portal of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 
23
 Fait Muedini, Sponsoring Sufism: How Governments Promote ‘’mystical Islam’’ in their Domestic and Foreign 
Policies, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2015. 
24
 Louw, Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia.  
25
 Ibid.  
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should remain private.
26
 Due to its individual and non-hostile characteristics, Sufism has been 
perceived as liberal within society.  According to the International Association of Sufism 
(IAS), Sufism represents ‘a  belief system and discipline free from the confines of time and 
place’, while its absence of strict discipline and indoctrination suggests that it is universal and 
appealing for ‘people from diverse cultural backgrounds and all walks of life’.27 
Significantly, although many people in the post-Soviet era are not theologically committed to 
Sufi teachings, the underlying characteristics reflect a culture that is appealing for political 
elites to enhance their power.  
Historically, Islam and its relationship with the nation has been largely overlooked. With the 
ummah defining the community of faith, Islam has generally promoted itself as a world 
religion while its followers are primarily regarded as Muslims rather than representative of 
any particular nationality. However, Sufism has substantially contributed towards shaping the 
Central Asian identity, while the Naqshbandi Sufi order occupies a unique position in Uzbek 
national history and culture. In fact, Naqshbandiyya’s Sufi portrayal is central in 
understanding the prominent role of Islam in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. The Naqshbandi order 
emerged in the ancient city of Bukhara in Uzbekistan in the fourteenth century.
28
 According 
to Maria Elisabeth Louw, the Naqshbandiyya is renowned for its moderation in religious 
practice which is expressed in the order’s preference for a private and reticent relationship 
with God. The Naqshbandiyya and its unique relationship with Uzbekistan has resulted in the 
official promotion of its values and principles in the post-Soviet era. 
Sufism’s main characteristics, its relationship with Uzbekistan and the fall of communism 
represent crucial factors in understanding its political appeal in the post-Soviet era. With the 
Islamic revival that emerged throughout Central Asia by the late 1980s, the notion of 
‘religious legitimacy’ represented a pivotal target for political leaders in order to legitimise 
their rule. Stemming from Sufi’s asceticism and disregard for material matters, it has been 
perceived as ‘apolitical’ by governments.29  Along the same lines, Paul Pinto claims that 
‘‘Sufis are usually portrayed as the quietest and non-political forces.’’30  Although the 
perception that Sufi’s have no concern for politics and only focus on spiritual matters 
contains little support, its perception as ‘apolitical’ is attractive to elites in pursuit of religious 
                                                          
26
 ‘Jose Casanova, ‘Private and Public Religions’, Religion and Politics, Vol. 59. No. 1, pp. 17-57.  
27
 International Association of Sufism (IAS) 
28
 Louw, Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia. 
29
 Muedini, Sponsoring Sufism. 
30
 Ibid, p. 32. 
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and political appeal. Concerning the latter, Sufism’s opposition to Islamist groups reflects 
another reason behind its advocacy by governments. Historically, Sufism has rejected 
religious organisations such as Wahhabism due to its politicised interpretation of Islam.
31
  At 
an address of students of Islam in 1988, former Lybian president Muammar Gaddafi opined 
that ‘Sufism and Islamic principles should spread. It should spread instead of the misuse of 
religion, instead of the jugglery, distortion of religion, Muslim Brotherhood…and all other 
calls which have harmed Islam’.32  With its perceived moderation and rejection of more 
fundamentalist perspectives, in the post-Soviet era Sufism has become regarded by the Uzbek 
government as an acceptable alternative to more radical, politicized Islamic movements. As 
will be conveyed, religious popularity represents an important aspect of political survival; 
therefore, Sufism’s perception as ‘apolitical’ as well as its significance to the revival of Islam 
served as a strategic tool for the Karimov regime to enhance its power base.   
Soviet Impact on Islam: 
The official policy of the Soviet Union concerning religion played a crucial role in shaping 
the face of Islam in Uzbekistan after 1991. Karl Marx referred to religion as ‘the opium of the 
people’,33 while for Lenin religion was an ‘intolerable rival’ to be eliminated through 
‘aggressive antireligious action rather than waiting for history to take its course’.34 Thus, the 
ideological pretext of the Soviet Union created an extremely bleak picture for religion in the 
following decades. For the key Soviet policy makers, Islam was regarded as the most 
backward, xenophobic, gender discriminatory, and unprogressive of all religions, while it 
represented a threat to their modernization and nationalities policies.
35
 Aware of the influence 
of Islam in Central Asia, Stalin clarified that the elimination of Islam from the Soviet state 
had to be achieved ‘‘by indirect and more cautious ways’’.36  
The late 1920s and 1930s represented the most repressive decades for Islam in Central Asia.  
Under Stalin, Islamic institutions were destroyed, the ulama (Islamic hierarchy) and pirs (Sufi 
masters) were executed, while thousands of madrasas (Islamic educational institutions) were 
                                                          
31
 Ibid.  
32
BBC, ‘Libya Qadhafi Addresses Students of Islam: Calls for Muslim Unity in Face of ‘‘Western Colonialism’’, 
August 24, 1998.   
33
 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, December 1843-January 1844. 
34
 In Ubiria, Soviet Nation-Building in Central Asia, p. 179.  
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Ibid, p. 181.  
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shut down.
37
 Given the official state doctrine of ‘‘scientific atheism’’, anti-religious 
propaganda excelled, positioning Islam to the test of science with the aim of disproving it. 
During 1927-28, nearly all Islamic educational establishments in Uzbekistan were shut down 
and their students transferred to secular public schools. At the same time, all shari’ah courts 
in Uzbekistan were abolished and replaced by a uniform secular legal system.
38
 In 1929, the 
Law on Religious Associations was introduced in order to outlaw religious activities such as 
religious education for minors, proselytising, and fundraising for political purposes.
39
 Against 
the backdrop of the Stalinist purges of 1937-38, the repressive communist apparatus in 
Tashkent expelled thousands of native communists for alleged affiliation with Islamic groups 
in the region.
40
 Thus, much of the long-term destruction to Islam was experienced during the 
first two decades of Soviet rule. Moreover, Sufi orders became prime targets of the campaign 
against Islam. They were perceived as clandestine organisations united with anti-Soviet 
sentiment and Sufism was exposed as an example of the backwardness of Uzbekistan.
41
 
Although a small minority of Sufi groups managed to survive underground, the Naqshbandi 
movement was annihilated.
42
 Another important component of Uzbek retrogression was 
literacy. Many religious scripts of Central Asian languages were converted to the Slavic 
Cyrillic, rendering the vast majority of Uzbeks illiterate in relation to Islam.
43
 
Interestingly, even though the Uzbek people were starved of almost all religious knowledge 
and practice, Islam continued to serve as a form of identity. Throughout history, Islam in 
Central Asia has frequently been referred to as a culture or way of life and this notion was 
reinforced during the Soviet era. Despite the noticeable secularizing trend among Uzbeks, 
especially in urban areas, Islam survived as a symbol of national and cultural identity.
44
 The 
close relationship between Islam and national identity represents a paramount symbol of 
Stalin’s nationalities policy in the 1920s which divided Central Asia into five different 
territorially defined national units. According to the prominent Uzbek scholar, Tolib 
Saidbayev, the nationalities policy and the Soviet Union’s official stance towards religion 
                                                          
37
 Johan Rasanayagam, Islam in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan: The Morality of Experience, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011, p. 73.   
38
 Rasanayagam, The politics of culture and the space for Islam.  
39
‘Law on Religious Organizations’. Criminal Code of the RSFSR, Religious Organizations (RSFSR). April 8, 1929. 
40
 Ubiria, Soviet Nation-Building in Central Asia. 
41
 Muedini, Sponsoring Sufism.  
42
 Elisabeth Ozdalga, The Naqshbandis in Western and Central Asia: Change and Continuity, Svenska 
forskningsinstitutet Istanbul, 1999.  
43
 Ubiria, Soviet Nation-Building in Central Asia.  
44
 Muedini, Sponsoring Sufism.  
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coincided to create ‘‘two dimensions’’ of Islam.45 In relation to the public sphere, Uzbeks 
were thoroughly Sovietised in their attitudes and behaviour. Conversely, in the private 
domain they retained a largely traditional outlook where Islamic customs were subsumed as 
national traditions.
46
  Indeed, Islamic birthday, funeral, and wedding rites and the Muslim 
tradition of circumcision continued to be observed in Uzbekistan and were regarded as 
‘national’ traditions.47 In addition, group outings to holy places, such as to the shrines of 
saints, remained popular but were generally regarded as social occasions without strict 
religious attachment.
48
  
Furthermore, as a result of the nationalities policy, Muslim intellectuals were segregated from 
their peers abroad in countries such as Turkey and Afghanistan. In turn, Islam became a 
predominantly localised force for Uzbek communities, which cemented Islam as a regional 
religion.
49
 According to Gaziev, one could not be Uzbek while simultaneously rejecting the 
identity of Islam in society.
50
 Indeed, the Soviet antireligious campaign targeted Islam as a 
belief system; however, what mattered most to people was their perception of Islam as an 
expression of ethnic identity.
51
 From the nation-building perspective, Islam and its 
contribution to Uzbek national identity may be regarded as one of the major consequences of 
the Kremlin-led nation-making in Central Asia. Simultaneously, the dichotomy between 
localised and foreign versions of Islam, established during the colonial period, would 
represent a source of considerable conflict in the post-independence era.   
For many centuries, Islam in Uzbekistan performed as a belief and cultural system which 
served to identify the region. However, it was only from the Soviet era that Islam could 
accurately be considered a component of national identity in Uzbekistan. After Stalin’s death, 
the levels of religious persecution in the Soviet Union significantly diminished. However, it 
was the impact of the Iranian revolution, the Afghan mujahedeen, as well as Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s reconsideration of the role of religion in the Soviet Union, which played a 
decisive and incontrovertible role in the revival of Islam in Central Asia.
52
 Significantly for 
                                                          
45
 T. Saidbayev, Islam and Society, Moscow: Nauka, 1984, p. 237.  
46
 Ibid. 
47
  Ubiria, Soviet Nation-Building in Central Asia.  
48
 Shirin Akiner, ‘Islam, the State and Ethnicity in Central Asia in Historical Perspective’, Religion, State & 
Society, Vol 24, (2/3), 1996 
49
 Erik S. Krausen, ‘Central Asia: Can Secular Islam Survive?’ The Diplomat, April 10, 2015.  
50
 Jamshid Gaziev, ‘Islamic Revival in Post-Independence Uzbekistan’, the Fletcher Journal of Development 
Studies, Vol. xvi – 2000, pp. 1-10.  
51
 Akiner, ‘Islam, the State and Ethnicity in Central Asia in Historical Perspective’. 
52
 Muedini, Sponsoring Sufism.  
   
17 
 
Uzbekistan, the new religious policy of the Soviet Union regarding religion would serve to 
further strengthen the notion of national identity. In 1988, coinciding with the celebration of 
the millennium of Christianity in Russia, Gorbachev called for a more tolerant attitude 
towards The Russian Orthodox Church in the interest of national unity: ‘‘Believers are Soviet 
people, workers, patriots, and they have the full right to express their conviction with dignity. 
Perestroika and democratization concern them too – in full measure and without any 
restriction.’’53 In Uzbekistan, this act of symbolism was perceived as a Russo-centric move 
while the official position vis a vis Islam remained the same. Indeed, Sufi Muslims still had to 
request passes to visit tombs of their own saints, while December 1988 marked spontaneous 
student protests in Tashkent concerning the continued ‘unfair’ policies towards Islam 
perceived as discrimination towards Uzbekistan.
54
 Sensing the atmosphere and the accord 
between Islam and national identity, the native Uzbek political elite was unknowingly 
observing the requirements for nation-building in the subsequent years. Uzbekistan’s 
historical relationship with Sufism as well as the persecution of Islam under Soviet rule 
highlight the importance of Islam to the nation-building process after independence.  
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Chapter 3 – Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan 
In post-Soviet Uzbekistan, the ‘official’ revival of Islam was exemplified in the nation-
building process. Nation-building can be described as a process of homogenisation where the 
political body seeks to unite its citizenry in the framework of ‘the nation’. This is often 
achieved through national language promotion, the re-writing of history, national myths and 
symbols, the promotion of national culture, and communication systems such as newspapers 
and television. In post-Soviet Uzbekistan, these distinct and overlapping mechanisms served 
to highlight religion as a central characteristic of ‘the nation’. 
The role of religion in post-Soviet Uzbekistan has been subject to some dichotomous 
scholarly interpretations. On the one hand, scholars such as Jeff Haynes claim that the official 
revival of Islam was purely political, while scholars such as Gaziev claim that the Islamic 
revival initially emerged as a cultural episode in the development of the country.
55
 What both 
opposing viewpoints fail to grasp is the intrinsic relationship between the cultural and 
political significance of Islam. With the requirements for nation-building after 1991, Islam 
and its cultural appeal constituted an integral component of the government’s nationalist 
programme. With regards to Gellner’s notion of the congruency of the ‘political and national 
unit’, it is necessary to have a state and a homogenised culture amalgamated into one entity, 
which is achievable through a nationalist doctrine. For Gellner, there is no doubt as to where 
the responsibility of national construction lies, remarking that ‘nationalism is, essentially, the 
general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up 
the lives of the majority’.56 In other words, a shared national culture is enforced by the state 
on all segments of society. However, for Gellner, this ‘high culture’ that binds nations does 
not consider anthropological factors such as history, ethnicity, and religion, but reflects the 
homogenisation of society through generic education and the process of urbanisation.
57
 
Gellner’s conception of national culture runs parallel to Weber’s central notion of rationality, 
where logic and empiricism define modernity. However, Weber, like Anthony Smith, 
acknowledges that distinct anthropological, cultural, or political commonalities, or common 
historical experiences, may serve as the bases of nation-building.
58
 As will be observed in the 
case of Uzbekistan, culture in the traditional sense provided the foundations for national 
construction.  
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Appealing to ‘the nation’: 
According to the German philosopher Georg Hegel, ‘the spirit of a nation is reflected in its 
history and its religion’, while this national spirit ‘requires the respective contributions of folk 
religion and political institutions.’59 Thus, in order for concepts such as religion to become 
part of the makeup of the nation, the support of the state apparatus is necessary. Reciprocally, 
in order to justify its monopoly, the state is required to embrace aspects that may be regarded 
as seminal in respect of national interests and values. After 1991, Uzbekistan witnessed the 
official endorsement of Islam as an integral component of national culture. With the 
emergence of independence in 1991, the Communist Party of Uzbekistan conveyed a policy 
of tolerance towards Islam and its growing popularity: ‘The republican party organisation is 
actively in favour of freedom of religion and the legal rights of the believer, and for 
cooperation with religious organisations, …believers are entitled to all opportunities for 
participation in the public, political, and cultural life of the republic’.60 This presence of Islam 
in Uzbek society was positively acknowledged one year later, when the newly independent 
state drafted its first constitution aimed at appealing for national recognition in the post-
Soviet era. According to article 31 under Personal Rights and Freedoms, ‘Freedom of 
conscience shall be guaranteed to all. Everyone shall have the right to profess or not to 
profess any religion. A compulsory imposition of religion shall be impermissible’.61 Another 
significant gesture towards Islam after independence was represented by the Uzbek national 
flag. Like other post-Soviet Central Asian states which sought to homogenise its society, such 
as Turkmenistan, the crescent moon as a prominent symbol of Islam is present.
62
 Meanwhile, 
in the first few years of independence an oath of office was frequently displayed alongside 
the Qur’an, thus demonstrating the recognition of Islam in the national parliament. It was not 
only national emblems that symbolised the revival of Islam. Thousands of mosques have 
been constructed; in fact, out of the 7800 mosques in Central Asia, half of them were 
officially functioning in Uzbekistan.
63
 Also, over 100 madrassas (Islamic schools) were 
established in the country since independence demonstrating the state’s acknowledgement of 
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a religious education.
64
  The state’s initial support of the Islamic revival highlights the 
significance placed on Islam during the nation-building period.   
Religion as national culture in the formation of ‘the nation’: 
In the post-Soviet era, Islam can be categorised into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Islam. ‘Good’ Islam is 
portrayed as culturally authentic, tolerant of other religious traditions in the region, and non-
political.
65
 In contrast, ‘Bad’ Islam is characterised as foreign in origin, antithetical to Central 
Asian spiritual values, intolerant in that it espouses a narrow version of Islam that excludes 
many Central Asian practices, and politically motivated.
66
 Renan opines that a nation 
contains ‘a spiritual principle’ which is constituted by glorious moments in common in the 
past, a common will in the present.
67
 Often what provides an essential link between the past 
and the present is national culture. In Uzbekistan, the reconstruction of medieval history 
attained the responsibility of providing Uzbeks with a sense of national attachment during the 
nation-building process. In post-Soviet Uzbekistan, Islam and its promotion as an integral 
aspect of national culture satisfied nation-building demands while it also served to obtain 
vital legitimacy for the state. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Karimov regime 
promoted primordial concepts of ethnicity, with Uzbekistan’s unique cultural and spiritual 
heritage being referred to as the oltin meros (golden heritage), thereby providing the crucial 
link between a glorious national past and present-day nationhood. In the construction of a 
national identity, Islam was delicately connected to the oltin meros which served to promote 
cultural and spiritual values of Islam in the post-Soviet era, as opposed to politicised forms of 
Islam that threatened the self-identified integrity of the nation-state.      
The oltin meros presents the great Sufi scholars of the past who lived in the region as bearers 
of the ‘Golden Heritage’ to which the Uzbek nation is returning, while significantly it does 
not contain any reference to the centuries of Russian colonisation. The portrayal and role of 
the ‘Golden Heritage’ in Uzbekistan in the 1990s was profoundly a top-down operation. 
Aware that independence could not be achieved accordingly if people were not aware of their 
‘true history’, Karimov opined that from the first days of independence, ‘‘the state policy 
faced the significant task to revive that tremendous, precious spiritual and cultural heritage, 
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which has been built by our ancestors’’.68 The resurrection of Uzbekistan’s ‘ancestors’ and 
the construction of their presence in the nation was a main pursuit of the political elite behind 
the nation-building process. In September 1993, Islam Karimov and Abdullah Mukhtar Khan, 
the state mufti, pompously celebrated the 675
th
 anniversary of the birth of Baha’ al-Din 
Naqshband, founder of the Naqshbandi order, at his mausoleum near Bukhara.
69
 The 
following year, the 11
th
 century Sufi master Ahmad Yasawi was commemorated and was 
subject to numerous conferences throughout Central Asia that year.
70
 Karminov remarked 
that this venerated Sufi master symbolised ‘‘the strength of the spiritual heritage’’.71 Along 
the same message, Karimov described the Ramadan and Quarba as central milestones of the 
spiritual and religious heritage of the Uzbek people. The regime’s embrace of Sufism as the 
spiritual and cultural foundations of the Uzbek nation was assiduously targeted at the Uzbek 
citizenry. In his book, ‘Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century’, President 
Karimov recognises that ‘good’ Islam is intrinsically linked to culture, while the Uzbek 
people ought to embrace its spiritual and moral values, as ‘no society can progress without 
cultivating spiritual and moral values in its people’.72 For Geertz, a shared religion is often a 
symbol of primordial attachment. With the promotion of Sufism and its cultural and spiritual 
characteristics, the Uzbek government aimed to cultivate a national identity that was founded 
on primordial national ties.   
In Anthony Smith’s study on the role of ethnosymbolism, he concluded that a shared history 
and culture form the basis of the nation. As religion depicts a ‘cultural system’, religion can 
also be intertwined with the historical and cultural makeup of the nation.  In post-Soviet 
Uzbekistan, religious symbols were palpable and they contributed to the growing awareness 
of Uzbekistan’s cultural and spiritual past. It is important to note that after independence 
most Uzbeks were ignorant of basic rituals and beliefs of Islam, with many people continuing 
to pursue a secular path.
73
 Therefore, religious symbols played a vital role in proliferating 
awareness of Uzbekistan’s ‘unique’ past, while they reaffirmed the notion of Islam and its 
cultural significance to the nation. One of the most distinctive symbols of Islamic revivalism 
centred around the shrines of Sufi saints and scholars of the ‘Golden Heritage’ which have 
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been restored and patronised since independence.
74
 Adeeb Khalid remarks that shrines are 
what marked Central Asia as Muslim space.
75
 The mausoleums of Sufi saints regarded as 
central to Uzbekistan’s cultural past have become renovated as national monuments and 
represent important places for rituals. In the ancient city of Bukhara, a large complex 
containing a mosque, khanaqah (Sufi centre, residence), and madrasa has been constructed 
around the tomb of Baha ́uddin Naqshband.76 The shrine represents one of the most important 
places of pilgrimage in Central Asia, while it is symbolic of the relationship between Islam 
and national heritage. In the same city, the main street, once named after Vladimir Lenin, is 
called after Naqshband, and Sufi sayings ascribed to the saint appear on Billboards around 
the city.
77
 Through symbols, the people of Bukhara and Uzbekistan have become aware of 
the significance of Naqshband to national culture and heritage. Moreover, there are other 
cases where religious symbols serve to inform society about its national heritage. Since 1991, 
many old mosques that were shut down during the Soviet period have been restored as 
examples of historical national architecture.
78
 Under the Soviet Union, the alphabet was 
converted into the Slavic Cyrillic. However, after 1991 the Latin alphabet was reinstated and 
the Qur’an was translated into Uzbek for the first time in 1992, again highlighting the 
relationship between religion and national identity in the post-Soviet era. Also, funerals and 
weddings as traditions of Islam were legitimated as national tradition, and despite the 
enormous expenses that may incur, such celebrations are considered essential in order to 
maintain one’s status and social obligation.  
Another important symbol underscoring the relationship between Islam and national culture 
has been the amount of books, newspaper articles, and pamphlets on the prominent awliya 
(guardians) of Uzbekistan. In what can be termed as post-Soviet hagiography, these 
publications, presented almost entirely in the Uzbek language, represent another example 
where symbols related to religion served to inform society about the intrinsic link between 
Islam and the nation’s culture and heritage. During the Soviet period, there was strict 
censorship on the publishing of religious material, with the absence of hagiography on the 
traditions of Sufism and Sufi saints in Uzbekistan ensuring that many Uzbeks lost touch with 
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their nation’s past.79 In addition, the ‘Golden Heritage’ was briefly described in history 
textbooks as an era of oppression.
80
 As is the case with colonised peoples everywhere, many 
people began to accept their coloniser’s belief that their indigenous culture was parochial, 
backwards, and inferior. After independence, hagiography began to fill many bookstores and 
scholarly journals with much of the material concerning the Naqshbandi tradition and its 
cultural and historic significance to Uzbekistan. Most hagiography published in the 1990s has 
been designed as an introduction on Sufism for those with little or no previous knowledge.
81
 
One of the most prominent works in the post-Soviet era is Dilda Yar written by Sadiddin 
Bukhari who was a professor of literature at the University of Bukhara. It is a book that is 
clearly intended as an introduction to the Naqshbandi Sufi tradition while it carefully explains 
the order’s underlying principles and the relevance of the tariqa to national culture.82 Another 
acclaimed author of the hagiographical literature is Arif Usman, a professor of history at the 
Al-Biruni Oriental Institute in Tashkent. Not only has he published two influential books on 
the Naqshbandiyaa, he has also published numerous newspaper and journal articles while he 
has also appeared on radio and television discussing the significance of Sufi tradition to 
Uzbek history and heritage.
83
 Khalid posits that ‘pride in Islam as national heritage can 
coexist with complete lack of observance or indeed any belief at all’.84 Although many 
Uzbeks did not adhere to strict religious beliefs in the post-Soviet era, the influence of 
religious symbols in resurrecting the nation’s ‘glorious’ past created greater awareness of 
Uzbekistan’s Sufi tradition while it administered the notion that Islam and national identity 
were intrinsically connected.  
The role of education: 
Education represents another seminal component of nation-building. Hobsbawm and 
Anderson both agree that nation-building requires the responsibility of education in order to 
create and shape national identity. Hobsbawm argued that education provided the vital means 
for states to communicate with their inhabitants, enabling it ‘to spread the image and heritage 
of the nation and to inculcate attachment to it’.85  For Anderson, education represents a key 
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component of ‘print capitalism’ which serves to disseminate the idea of ‘the nation’.86 In 
post-Soviet Uzbekistan, education operated as a crucial platform to proliferate awareness of 
‘the nation’ while it also provided the opportunity for the state to control the nation-building 
narrative. Stemming from new laws passed on education in Uzbekistan in 1992 and 1996, the 
basic objectives of the education process included responding ‘to personal interests, 
legislative needs, and organizational, psychological and pedagogical conditions necessary for 
the formation of national culture, and to help to develop today’s citizens so that they are 
aware of their responsibilities to the state, society and their families’.87 With strong emphasis 
on language and history in particular, the new laws stipulated the importance of developing 
national consciousness while it was essential to comprehend the rich ‘cultural, historical, and 
intellectual traditions’ of Uzbekistan.88   
In post-Soviet Uzbekistan, there was a reluctance to educate students on national values 
through classes on religion, and students became aware of the ‘Golden Age’ primarily 
through history lessons. The re-writing of history textbooks and strong criticism of the Soviet 
era marked an important symbol of national belonging in the post-Soviet period. Karimov 
condemned Moscow for supressing everything that was national, including Islam, while 
school textbooks claimed that under Tsarist and Soviet expansion the ‘Uzbek people have 
lost their freedom and identity’.89 The history curriculum includes a lot of material on the 
lives of prominent religious figures of the past and seeks to explain their legacies by 
emphasising national values over religious ones.
90
 Religious figures such as Naqshband and  
Imam al-Bukhari represent sources of  commemorative events which are held in universities, 
in public schools, and in academic research institutions with students and staff required to 
attend.
91
 Moreover, the Madrassas (Islamic schools) accommodated those who wished to 
pursue an Islamic education. By 1992, the number of Madrassas in Uzbekistan amounted to 
over 100. These schools were carefully monitored by the state for fundamentalism and 
Islamism, while Sufism and its ‘humanitarian spirit’ was strongly encouraged.92 Also, 
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through youth organisations such as Kamelot, young inhabitants have become conscious of 
the cultural and spiritual heritage of the Uzbek ‘nation’.93 In post-Soviet Uzbekistan, 
education played an important and careful role in creating awareness of national symbols and 
heritage, while this was mainly accentuated through humanities subjects such as history, as 
opposed to religion.  
In post-independent Uzbekistan, the appeal of primordialism was essential in providing ‘the 
nation’ with a historical past which significantly influenced and dominated the nation-
building process after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Islam not only symbolised a vital tool 
for the nationalist strategy due to its historical relationship with Uzbekistan; it also 
represented a symbol of Soviet suppression and thereby required a revival after 1991. 
Uzbekistan represents a country with some ethnic and cultural tensions, with those failing to 
conform to the boundaries established by nation-building becoming situated outside the 
framework of ‘the nation’. According to Anderson, ‘the members of even the smallest nation 
will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the 
minds of each lives the image of their communion’.94 As will be discussed later, those who 
did not adhere to the ‘imagined community’ represented a vital feature in the fortifying of the 
Uzbek state.  
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Chapter 4 – Doing it for ‘the nation’ – State-building in the 1990s: 
Religious claims made during the nation-building process complemented state-building in the 
post-Soviet era. Throughout history it has generally been the case that state-building predated 
nation-building.  In the European context, modern state-building started with the crisis of 
feudalism, the Renaissance, and the Reformation.
95
 Unlike Aristotle, who claimed that the 
state was inherent in man’s nature and therefore represented a natural phenomenon, the 
historian Jacob Burckhardt argued that the state depicted ‘a work of art’ and since its origins 
had an artificial quality.
96
 In terms of basic attributes, a state may be described as the means 
of rule over a defined territory, while it is comprised of an executive, a bureaucracy, courts, 
and other vital institutions. As has already been stressed in the case of Uzbekistan, the post-
independence state dates back to the 1920s and represents an important symbol of the Soviet 
political legacy. One of the key remnants of the Soviet legacy in Central Asia centred around 
the state its structures. This notion was no more represented than in Uzbekistan where the 
Karimov regime administered state capacity in order to control the nation-building narrative. 
However, this does not suggest that the strengthening of the state was not a concern for the 
government in Tashkent. With independence, the revival of political Islam and the emergence 
of refreshed political opposition were perceived as representing a threat to the state. Thus, 
with the presence of new challenges, Karimov sought to delicately harmonise state and 
society by positioning both realms in the framework of ‘the nation’. By appealing to 
nationalist claims, the government pursued legitimacy which would in turn justify the 
creation and use of institutions which were formed to shelter and protect ‘the nation’. In post-
Soviet Uzbekistan, state-building is intertwined with state capacity and survival in order to 
reconstruct ‘the leviathan’ of the Soviet era. 
Continuity in the post-independence era: 
Conceptually speaking, communism and nationalism are often perceived as adverse 
phenomena. According to Andre Gerrits, ‘most communists believed that irrational, 
unpredictable and anachronistic nationalism was incompatible with the rational, science-
based and progressive world view of Marxism’.97 However, in practice, the conceptual 
asymmetry is rather nuanced with many communist leaders embracing national symbols and 
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promoting historical national leaders for purposes of political legitimacy. Thus, it can be 
argued that communist political structures together with national promotion represented 
important contributors in maintaining and justifying the status quo. In post-Soviet 
Uzbekistan, the political structures of the communist era survived and were exploited 
accordingly in order to control the nation-building narrative and legitimise the state. Rather 
than emerging among elites in a civil society positioned against the colonial regime, 
nationalism in Uzbekistan emerged within a state structure created by the colonial regime, 
while it is directed by the very personnel who were appointed by the colonial regime.
98
 
Indeed, Karimov depicted a classic communist party apparatchik who had risen to power and 
prominence through the rank and file of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (CPSU).
99
 
Although the Karimov administration exploited glasnost as an opportunity to criticise 
Moscow and thereby obtain domestic support, it opted for the survival of the Soviet Union. In 
fact, Tashkent supported the attempted Soviet coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991 with 
Karimov proclaiming that ‘sometimes I cannot be sure that Gorbachev is president’.100  
As previously mentioned, the greatest feature of continuity in post-Soviet Uzbekistan centred 
around the notion of the state. According to Henry Clarke, the US Ambassador to Uzbekistan 
between 1992-1995, certain political distinctions occurred, ‘The Communist party was gone. 
Karimov ruled his country through the government apparatus, not through the Communist 
party apparatus’.101 However, from Clarke’s observations during his three years in Tashkent, 
the culture of authority from the Soviet era prevailed, ‘It certainly represented an unbroken 
continuity from the Soviet period in terms of harsh treatment of citizens whenever they were 
deemed to be out of line.’102  Indeed, the political elite in Tashkent claimed that a strong state 
with centralised power was necessary as a means of preserving the cultural and spiritual 
heritage of the nation. As a means of gaining support, Karimov portrayed the state and its 
new responsibility as independent of Russian influence while it represented long-awaited 
national sovereignty. According to Karimov, the fact that for the first time in history the post 
of the President of the Republic stands at the helm represented a vital symbol of state-
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building and national independence.
103
 Despite such symbolism, the state-building project 
was centred around a top-down system emblematic of the Soviet era. Under the new 
constitution, a single system of power based around the presidency has been created, while 
Karimov has obtained control over the twelve regions of the country.
104
  Indeed, the 
construction of a powerful vertical system of executive power is exhibited by the President’s 
power to appoint regional governors.
105
 Moreover, the government has used the impact of 
symbols to stress the centrality of a strong state for Uzbekistan. The slogan "Uzbekistan's 
future is a great state" represents the second most common billboard in Uzbekistan. 
According to Charles Kurzman, ‘the most innocent interpretation of this slogan is a desire for 
improvement in the general welfare of the nation.’106 President Karimov’s five-point plan 
outlining the post-Soviet ideology strongly connects the notion of state power with the 
concerns of the nation. Karimov justifies his conviction of a strong state as it is inherently 
part of the ‘‘mentality, traditions and the way of life of the Uzbek people’’. Thus, in order to 
obtain political legitimacy and preserve the power base, Tashkent sought to position the state 
in the framework of ‘the nation’ by stressing its commitment and responsibility to the 
spiritual and cultural development of the Uzbek nation.   
Patrimonialism and strengthening the state: 
In post-Soviet Uzbekistan, the role of the individual depicted a central tenet in the 
strengthening the state. Although the constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan drafted in 
1992 commits to the protection of democratic rights and freedoms, democracy in post-Soviet 
Uzbekistan resembles more closely Fareed Zakaria’s ‘illiberal democracy’ where the 
existence of elections does not necessarily coincide with constitutional liberalism.
107
 In this 
sense, how did many of the regimes of the former Soviet space that struggled with the 
transition to democracy obtain support and prolong their power? The notion of 
patrimonialism provides a conceptual understanding with regards to the role of patronage and 
cohesion in legitimising and thenceforth enhancing the power of the state. Patrimonialism 
represents a central tenet of Max Weber’s conception of traditional authority.108 For Weber, 
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patrimonial authority is sanctioned by ‘tradition’ and the status of a sovereign, and is also 
supported by a sovereign’s personal administration.109 In the patrimonial regime, the notion 
of patriarchy and loyalty to the individual are essential characteristics. This also lends itself to 
the notion of patrimonial bureaucracy, where personnel are recruited and promoted to state 
institutions based on connections, family ties, ethnic background, and other characteristics 
not directly related to their ability to execute their assigned tasks in an effective or efficient 
manner, but based on their loyalty to the individual.
110
 In the post-Soviet era, the 
strengthening of the presidential office at the expense of other political institutions and the 
creation of bureaucracies closely affiliated with the president’s interest substantially 
contributed to the patrimonial characteristics of Uzbek political culture. Through the lenses of 
patrimonialism, state strengthening engendered by nationalist appeal can be explained in 
post-Soviet Uzbekistan.   
According to Maria Louw, ‘Karimov uses identification as a mode of legitimation, he makes 
ideology seem not the product of any ruling group’s self-interest, but instead the cultural, 
intellectual, and spiritual product of the entire nation, thus creating identification between the 
Uzbek nation, himself, and his policies’.111 Thus, in the post-independence era, Karimov 
positioned himself as the champion of Uzbek nation-building, thereby seeking to integrate 
state and society within the framework of the nation. Just as twentieth century nationalist 
leaders such as Mussolini and Slobodan Milosevic presented themselves as the Julius Caesar 
of their respective nations, Karimov utilised the revival of Islam to position himself as the 
resurrection of Uzbekistan. In his first book, entitled, ‘Uzbekistan: Along the Road of 
Deepening Economic Reform’, Karimov presents national traditions concerning Islam and 
the role of the state in an identical framework, ‘There is a rise of the spiritual role of our 
forefathers’ religion – Islam – in the life of man and his family. Morality and charity 
harmoniously combine secularism of our state and freedom of conscience’.112 A few years 
later, Karimov articulated his personal convictions with regards to Islam, ‘I am a son of this 
nation. … As a Muslim child, Islamic understanding …is established in my heart and my 
soul, and I will not give up on my devotion now or in the afterlife’.113 Karimov’s embrace of 
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Islam as a crucial component of national identity was demonstrated when he became the first 
post-Soviet leader to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1992.
114
  
Moreover, the independent state established manaviyat (spirituality) as the centrepiece of the 
state’s ideology which aimed to fill the void left by Marxism-Leninism. According to 
Zhumaev, an academic and close aide to Karimov, the wave of perestroika brought about an 
‘ideological immunity’ of the social consciousness which was fraught with serious 
consequences.
115
 For Karimov, ideology is necessary ‘in order to protect our people from 
various ideological threats’, an ideology that is ‘authentically humanist’, ‘comprising in itself 
a powerful impulse towards the spiritual uplifting of the nation’.116 According to Johan 
Rasanayagam, Karimov’s commitment to an ideology symbolises continuity with the past, as 
‘the need for a national ideology is itself founded on the Soviet view that individual 
consciousness is a reflection of a material order of society’.117 However, whereas primordial 
culture and traditions supposedly impeded the socialist transformation during the Soviet era, 
the new state saw them as the raison d’etre of the national ideology. Manaviyat strongly 
accentuated the cultural sphere of nation-building which was allegedly applied to legitimate 
the state and create a reflective society. At the heart of the new ideology is the idea of Uzbek 
authenticity, which is rooted at the heart of the ‘Golden Age’.118 Emphasised by a 
government publication released in 2001, The Idea of National Independence, the state 
propagates the notion of komil inson (The perfect person), in other words, the person who 
adheres to the humanistic, cultural, and spiritual values of the Uzbek nation.
119
 Apart from 
publications by Karimov and the state, Manaviyat is also promoted through public symbols, 
such as billboards, across the capital.
120
  After independence, the role of the President and 
official state publications reflected the state’s capacity to legitimise its strengthening.  
The role of institutions 
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According to American scholar Jack Snyder, a process of democratisation ensued after the 
collapse of communism and this process produced nationalism where powerful elites 
harnessed popular energies in order to justify a partial form of democracy and thereafter 
conserve their power.
121
 During this process, elites exploited weak institutionalisation and 
created national institutions which would enable the government to determine the nationalist 
narrative.
122
 In post-Soviet Uzbekistan, institutions reflected state control and power vis a vis 
nation-building. President Karimov was highly critical of the Soviet approach towards Islam 
in Uzbekistan. However, the state’s inflexible constraint on Islam after independence 
underlines continuity with the Soviet past. In 1992, the Muslim Spiritual Board of Uzbekistan 
replaced the Soviet-era Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and 
Kazakhstan.
123
 With the prohibition of religious political parties, the state-controlled 
institution sought to prevent the emergence of other expressions of politicised Islam. The 
functions exercised by the Muslim Spiritual Board included the registration of mosques and 
madrassas, the appointment and dismissal of individual imams, dictating the contents of 
sermons, and the issuing of religious edicts. .
124
 Acceptable Muslim practice became limited 
to that which took place within the framework of such institutions, while those religious 
organisations that failed to comply with state standards were stigmatised as ‘Wahhabis’ and 
therefore ostracised from Islam’s contribution to national construction.125 With the authority 
of the Muslim Spiritual Board, many new mosques that emerged after independence have 
been de-registered and closed down. As an example of the state’s role in religious life after 
1991, sermons that failed to express support for the government, praise President Karimov, or 
expounded views that strayed from the government line were excluded.
126
  
Another important institution pertaining to the control of religion was the Committee on 
Religious Affairs of the Cabinet of Ministers. Directly under the authority of parliament and 
the President, the Committee played a central role in the persecution of independent or 
‘unofficial’ Muslims. With new laws introduced in 1998, one of the committee’s key 
responsibilities was to articulate views on the content of religious literature and the 
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significance of Sufi beliefs.
127
 State-controlled institutions such as the Muslim Spiritual 
Board and the Committee on Religious Affairs of the Cabinet of Ministers are prime 
examples of the state’s control in dictating the religious narrative, while it is symbolic of the 
strengthening and capacity of the state in the post-Soviet era.  
The media represents another institution of crucial significance in facilitating state control 
and strengthening in Uzbekistan during the 1990s. According to Snyder and Karen 
Ballentine, imperfect institutions of the political marketplace which are present during the 
initial process of democratisation enable control of the media, with a state monopoly of the 
media providing the political hierarchy with the apparatus to conceive a link between state 
and society through nationalist propaganda.
128
 Although the Uzbek constitution of 1992 
stated that ‘the mass media shall be free and act in accordance with the law. It shall bear 
responsibility for trustworthiness of information in a prescribed manner. Censorship is 
impermissible’,129 the media in Uzbekistan has served as the mouthpiece of the government. 
Almost all media is owned by the state, while the Law on Mass Media made it extremely 
difficult to set up a private, independent newspaper. In the law, it states that the ‘right to 
found mass media belongs to the Councils of People’s Deputies and other state bodies…’.130 
The print media is dominated by three national newspapers, Khalq Sozi (People’s Word), 
Narodnoe Slovo, and the Pravda Vostoka (Truth of the East). However, television has proven 
the most successful platform for disseminating propaganda.
131
 With all television directly 
controlled by the state, Uzbek society has been subject to a very particular narrative in the 
post-Soviet era. In September 1993, Islam Karimov unveiled a statue of Timur where a 
monument of Karl Marx had previously stood in the centre of Tashkent, with Timur 
representing the centrepiece of historical Uzbek political and cultural dominance in Central 
Asia. Captured skilfully by state television, parallels were conceived between Timur and 
Karimov suggesting that the President embodied the awakening of Uzbekistan.
132
 Moreover, 
promotion of the ‘golden heritage’ was complemented by the dissemination of religious 
slogans. In order to shape the narrative of the Islam revival, state television released 
programmes in relation to Sufism and its historical relationship with the nation, while 
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newspapers and articles accentuated slogans such as ‘our religion’ and ‘let us protect our 
religion’.133 The idea was clear, to position ‘good’ Islam in the framework of the nation, 
while ‘bad’ Islam was foreign and posed a threat to Uzbekistan. By manipulating the 
imperfect institutions of the political marketplace, such as the media, the post-Soviet state 
succeeded in controlling propaganda and the dissemination of information which played a 
vital role in legitimising the state’s authority after independence.  
Finally, education represents another example of institutional strength and capacity which 
contributed towards enhancing the power of the state in the post-Soviet period. Speaking in 
the context of education in European nation-states, sociologists Francisco Ramirez and John 
Boli claimed that ‘states became engaged in authorizing, funding, and managing mass 
schooling as part of an endeavour to construct a unified national polity.  Within such a polity, 
individuals were expected to find their primary identification with the nation, and it was 
presumed that state power would be enhanced by the universal participation of citizens in 
national projects’.134 As previously mentioned, the state applied the Soviet model of secular 
education, although clear differences were represented in the areas of history and language. 
Public education in the 1990s was determined by national requirements and state objectives. 
However, the state’s control with regards to exclusively religious education illuminates its 
institutional capacity to impose a uniformed authority on education. In Uzbekistan, non-state 
controlled religious education is forbidden. Under the Law on Religion, ‘Religious schools 
obtain the right to operate after their registration at the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan’, while religious educational establishments ‘can be refused registration if 
provisions of its rules or other documents contradict provisions of the present law or other 
laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan.’135 In an interview with Forum 18 News Service, 
Abdurasul Abdulayev, the vice-principal of Tashkent's Islamic Institute, stressed the 
influence of the state concerning religious education, ‘‘the central [state-controlled] 
administration for Muslims in Uzbekistan is the Spiritual Administration of Muslims in 
Uzbekistan (the muftiate), and specialist Islamic education is provided in the muftiate's 
                                                          
133
 Ziyaera Diora, Martha Brill Olcott, ‘Islam in Uzbekistan: Religious Education and State Ideology’, Carnegie 
Endowment, No. 91, July 2008, p. 17.  
134 Francisco O Ramirez and John Boli, ‘The Political Construction of Mass Schooling, European Origins and 
Worldwide Institutionalisation’, Sociology of Education, Vol. 60, No. 1, Jan 1987, p. 3.   
 
135
 The Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, Article 9 and 
12, May 1, 1998, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. 
   
34 
 
educational establishments.’’136 Moreover, in 1999 the Tashkent Islamic University (TIU) 
was established by a presidential decree when Islam Karimov ordered the creation of a  
“secular education institution that prepares specialists in Islamic studies and Islamic law.”137 
Under control by the Muslim Spiritual Board, TIU’s primary aim was to establish the state’s 
interpretation of Islam as the status quo in educational organisations through secular training 
and the installation of secular curricula.
138
 In post-Soviet Uzbekistan, state capacity has 
resulted in the overall strengthening of the state. Through platforms such as the Muslim 
Spiritual Board and presidential decrees, Tashkent has successfully imposed its institutional 
authority in the realm of education, thereby expanding the influence and power of the state in 
the post-Soviet era.   
By the decline of the Soviet Union, the notion of a strong and authoritative state was firmly 
ingrained in Uzbek political life and culture. In order to preserve this, national legitimacy and 
institutional capacity and strengthening represented the fundamental pillars of state-building 
after 1991.  By closely associating himself with the revival of Islam, President Karimov 
seemingly embraced religion as a crucial feature of nation-building and national 
independence in the post-Soviet period. Simultaneously, institutional capacity inherited from 
the Soviet period enabled the regime to intensify its control in crucial sectors of national 
influence, such as the media, education, and the law. Overall, continuity and change 
harmonised in the first decade of independence to enhance the authority and legitimacy of the 
political elite in Tashkent. As will be argued in the following chapter, the evolution of the 
state was wholly reflective in the realm of national security as the millennium approached.  
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Chapter 5 – Enemies of the ‘Nation’ 
In reference of political leaders, Eric Hobsbawm has opined that an ‘identification with a 
'people' or 'nation', however defined, was a convenient and fashionable way to accumulate 
legitimacy.
139
 In the post-Soviet era, the complimentary processes of nation-building and 
state-building reflected the centrality of legitimacy for the Karimov regime. By determining a 
national narrative and simultaneously enhancing the position of the state, the government 
obtained the necessary means to ‘justify’ its destruction of political opposition. After 
independence, the authorities used political Islam in order to demonstrate the existence of 
organisations that opposed the Uzbek ‘nation’. Interestingly, Karimov presented the threat of 
Islamic extremism as an international issue, caused by countries such as Iran, rather than a 
national one where opposition represented a source of profound domestic division.
140
  State-
sanctioned national identity coupled with the state’s capacity to shape and frame ‘enemies’ 
would represent the final stage of the reinsertion of ‘the leviathan’ in the post-Soviet era.  
Opposition as anti- ‘national’ 
As previously mentioned, a central debate with regards to Uzbek independence concerns the 
role of the revival of Islam. It has been argued that the revival was not politically but 
culturally oriented, with M. Z. Hussein claiming that the revival is neither ‘‘exclusively 
fundamentalist’’, nor ‘‘predominantly political’’, but primarily cultural.141 Conversely, 
scholars such as Jeff Haynes argue that Islamic organisations with political objectives do 
exist in Uzbekistan, offering an alternative governmental structure to that of the current 
‘reformed’ government.142 Both opinions are not mutually exclusive, as the state has 
emphasised the cultural dimension of Islam in Uzbekistan in order to expose politicised 
perspectives of Islam. In this regard, it is first necessary to examine the struggle against 
Islamic extremism within the context of state legitimacy during the transition to 
independence. In line with Tashkent’s official endorsement of ‘folk Islam’ as a central 
component of nation-building, cultural authenticity became the criterion through which the 
government distinguished between ‘supporters’ and ‘enemies’ of the Uzbek nation. Although 
the regime celebrated the Islamic cultural heritage of the region and invokes the moral and 
ethical values stemming from it, it also sought to expose the danger posed by the ‘wrong’ 
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kind of Islam.
143
 For Karimov, it was essential ‘to make clear the difference between spiritual 
values of religion and certain ambitions-political or other aggressive goals, that are far from 
religion’.144 In this sense, those who did not subscribe to the state’s interpretation of Islam did 
not possess ‘religious’ values and therefore represented a direct threat to national progress. 
The government did not view alternate interpretations of Islam as part of the nation's 
traditions, seeing them instead as denoting 'backwardness, obscurantism, and fanaticism'. 
145
 
With its self-representation of Islam, the state has offered a clear choice for the people of 
Uzbekistan, they can have a future led by “enlightened people with a scientific world view” 
who are able to combine the best aspects of modern life and their heritage, or by 
“barbarians... ignorant, uneducated people who use pseudo–Islamic slogans to increase their 
own power.”146 Overall, the state’s control of official Islam is essential in order to discuss the 
crackdown of opposition after independence.  
In Uzbekistan, the notion ‘to Islamise is to radicalise’ best describes the state’s perspective 
towards political opposition in the post-Soviet period. ‘To Islamise’ is broadly defined. 
Fundamentalism, it states, “struggles to maintain religion in its original form”, with an 
official text stating that it is synonymous with ‘‘fundamentalism’’ and ‘‘wahhabism’’, while 
“extremism” comes from the fundamentalists’ lust for power, which leads them to give 
religion “a political coloration” and to attempt to take over the state.147 In the post-Soviet era, 
such terms were gratuitously adopted by the authorities to delegitimise political opponents. 
According to Neil Melvin, one of the main aims of the central authority was to ‘eliminate 
independent views and re-establish Soviet-style fear and coercion’.148 However, the brief 
period of liberation under Gorbachev between 1988-1991 facilitated the rise of several 
political organisations and represented a threat to the established political authority. One of 
the main organisations to emerge towards the end of the Communist era was the Birlik 
(Unity) People’s Movement and the associated Birlik Party.149 Its central aims were cultural-
nationalist: it sought to make Uzbek the sole state language; end ‘‘unjustified denigration’’ of 
Central Asian historical figures; while it also sought a guarantee of individual rights against 
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the state.
150
 Interestingly, it also pursued the decentralisation of authority in Uzbekistan 
which was perceived as a direct threat to the leading party. It is within this context the 
Karimov regime aimed to undo the Birlik Party, arguing that the absence of a centralised state 
would facilitate the ambitions of fundamentalists.
151
  To demonstrate the governments 
capacity vis a vis the opposition, the official press remained implacably hostile towards 
organisations such as Birlik, while the government passed laws in the spring of 1991 
protecting the respectability of the President and top officials.
152
 Under the new laws, the 
prohibition of public organisations that pursued ‘‘the destruction of the moral foundations of 
society and universal humanistic values’’ was introduced.153 After a landslide victory in the 
presidential election in December 1991, the Karimov government brought an end to the 
liberation of political opposition enabled by Gorbachev’s policies of Perestroika and 
Glasnost. Throughout 1992-1993, a number of opposition leaders were assaulted or 
disappeared, and in October 1993 the Birlik Party was essentially banned as the government 
prevented its registration with the Ministry of Justice.
154
 The fate of the Birlik Party 
symbolises the real concerns of the political elite at the dawn of independence. Although the 
Birlik Party and the government shared similar policies concerning the post-Soviet future, it’s 
perceived threat to the power base of Uzbekistan’s apparatchiks provided the raison d’etre to 
exclude it from the nation-building process. After consolidating power in 1992, any 
organisation which seemingly challenged the authority of the state represented an ‘extremist’, 
‘fundamentalist’, or ‘Islamist sympathiser’ and therefore found itself against the ‘nation’.  
International terrorism and the justification of state policy:  
In the early 1990s, the Uzbek state used the conflicts in Tajikistan and Afghanistan in order 
to highlight the dangers experienced in the absence of strong authorities and therefore sought 
to legitimise its policy of supporting a strong, centralised state. After the Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan in 1989, the interest of the United States in that country evaporated while 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to strongly support the Mujahedeen.
155
 Recognising the 
growing anarchy and chaos that emerged in the subsequent years of the war with Russia,  
Mohammad Najibullah, the then president of Afghanistan, pleaded with the US for support in 
the struggle against the Mujahedeen and Islamic extremism, ‘We have a common task, 
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Afghanistan, the United States of America, and the civilized world, to launch a joint struggle 
against fundamentalism’, before stating what he anticipated would emerge in Afghanistan if 
fundamentalism pursued: ‘If fundamentalism comes to Afghanistan, war will continue for 
many more years’.156 Without sufficient support, the Mujahedeen ousted the government in 
Kabul in the following months and Afghanistan became a conspicuous symbol of 
statelessness and terrorism.
157
 The civil war in Tajikistan represented another example of the 
perils of extremism that Islam Karimov could alert his population about. In May 1992, civil 
war broke out in Tajikistan between Russia-aligned elites and a coalition of pro-democracy 
activists and advocates of an Islamic State.
158
 During the five-year crisis, 50,000 people were 
killed, some 1.2 million were displaced, while Tajikistan became a haven for extremist 
organisations and terrorism.
159
 In Uzbekistan, the Tajik crisis became a ‘justification’ for the 
state to implement restrictive religious laws. In 1998, Karimov declared that if the state did 
not adopt an uncompromising stance against extremist organisations, “Tajikistan will come to 
Uzbekistan tomorrow.”160 Moreover, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov 
drew clear parallels between extremism and the situation in Tajikistan, “Religious extremism 
is coming from the south. They want to devastate the country and establish a non-secular 
system like in Tajikistan…. Uzbekistan is next.”161 By claiming that ‘‘Uzbekistan is next’’, 
the state sought to justify its position vis a vis Islamic opposition. The peril of international 
terrorism throughout the 1990s in countries such as Afghanistan and Tajikistan served to 
legitimate the state’s claim that extremism was a product of foreign forces while it provided 
the state the opportunity to rationalise its shaping of national construction and state 
strengthening.  
Since gaining independence, the clampdown on ‘unofficial’ Islam has been clearly 
manifested and ‘justified’ in the nation-building and state-building processes. From the 
arrests and disappearances of suspicious imams in the Ferghana Valley, the shutdown of 
hundreds of mosques, to the restriction on Islamic clothing,
162
 the events that took place in 
the late 1990s symbolised exactly what the state sought to exhibit since 1991: that 
unregulated Islam poses a threat to national security. In December 1997, the murder of 
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several police officers in the eastern province of Namangan provided a pretext for the 
Karimov regime to heavily repress independent Islam, arguing that it represented a serious 
threat to the country’s stability.163 When a group of masked men killed a high ranked official 
of the transport police (GAI), Tashkent dispatched elite troops to arrest many so-called 
‘Wahhabis’ in the region.164 The following year, a series of show trials were conducted in 
which various alleged Wahhabis were found guilty of Islamic extremism and ‘‘encroachment 
upon the constitutional system of the Republic of Uzbekistan’’.165 The situation in Namangan 
underscores the role of security in enhancing the power and support of the state. After the 
attack, the central authorities closed down several independent mosques, the Muslim Spiritual 
Board ordered the removal of key religious leaders, while a new censorship apparatus was 
designed to curtail the flow of religious material from abroad.
166
 In order to demonstrate the 
power of the state in the face of security threats, by May 1998 the national parliament revised 
the 1991 law on ‘freedom of conscience and religious organisations’ and imposed new 
restrictions on religious groups.
167
 According to article 8 on ‘Religious organisations’, 
organisations that comprise of more than a hundred members must register with the state and 
may be still refused registration.
168
 In terms of institutional control in the post-Soviet era, the 
state-controlled media has claimed those accused of ‘Wahhabism’ aim to destabilise the 
constitutional order of the republic while it informed the general population to be vigilant of 
the ‘‘enemy from within’’.169 The events in Namangan highlight the state’s control of 
security perceptions and ‘justify’ it’s embrace of ‘folk Islam’ opposed to politicised Islam 
that presents a major threat to national security. 
By 1999, international ‘terrorism’ became a central concern of the international community. 
From the Moscow Bombings to the growing concerns of the United States regarding the 
potency of Al Qaeda, it appeared that sharing similar concerns represented a convenient 
platform to gaining international legitimacy. On February 16, 1999, five bombs exploded 
near government buildings in Tashkent, claiming 16 lives and injuring over 130.
170
 President 
Karimov immediately accused ‘Islamic extremists’ as chief perpetrators of the attack, while it 
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served to justify a state-sanctioned clampdown on independent Islam.
171
 The state claimed 
that the aim of the attack was to kill the President, which represented a serious threat to the 
nation, and Karimov vowed to hold accountable ‘the fathers who have brought enemies of the 
state up…together with their children’.172 In Waever’s conception of securitization, the 
notion of Speech Act is necessary when discussing the threshold of what constitutes a security 
issue. ‘In naming a certain development a security problem, the ‘‘state’’ can claim a special 
right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites’.173 By 
defining the magnitude of the bombings, the state withheld the capacity to measure the 
response required in order to preserve stability. The bombings resulted in the arrests of 
thousands of independent Muslims, with the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan eventually 
sentencing six people to death and 16 others to long prison terms.
174
 Moreover, this period 
also witnessed the rise of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Originated from the 
Ferghana Valley, the IMU sought to overthrow the Karimov regime and replace it with an 
Islamic Caliphate.
175
 Although the IMU, with international links to groups such as the 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda, was never officially convicted of the bombings, its growing threat in 
Uzbekistan provided an opportunity to further justify the clampdown against ‘bad’ Islam in 
order to protect national society from groups such as the IMU. By the end of the decade, 
thousands of Muslims in Uzbekistan were arrested, many tortured, hundreds of mosques 
closed down, and many religious leaders perceived as a threat to the state were either in exile, 
disappeared, or in prison. The events in Namangan and Tashkent highlight the capacity of the 
state, established by national legitimacy and state-building, to 'justify' its strategy. 
According to President Karimov, ‘we support the idea that religion should accomplish its role 
in introducing the highest spiritual, moral, and ethical values, and in helping to form the 
historical and cultural heritage of the population’.176 Here, the cultural and spiritual 
dimension of Islam, a foundation of the nation-building process, must be preserved. 
However, in order to protect the ‘right’ Islam, ‘we will never allow religious slogans to be 
exploited in the struggle for power…because in this we see a serious danger to the stability of 
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our state’.177 In this sense, Karimov justifies the campaign against ‘unofficial’ Islam in order 
to protect the ‘nation’. By the end of the century, the nation-building and state-building 
processes harmonised to provide the state with the claim on the 'monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force', thus reinserting ‘the leviathan’ in the post-Soviet era. 
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Conclusion – The Interplay between Ideology and Pragmatism 
Islam and its manifestation in post-Soviet Uzbekistan symbolises the intrinsic relationship 
between nation-building and state-building on the one hand, and political survival on the 
other. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was inevitable that national independence 
and its consolidation required the symbiotic processes of nation-building and state-building. 
Such processes would not only serve to pronounce political and cultural independence from 
the colonial past; they would also unite society and state within the framework of the 
‘nation’. As Communist apparatchiks, the political authority in Tashkent understood the role 
of ideology in forging a united political community. ‘The Ideology of National 
Independence’, replacing Marxism-Leninism, stressed the paramountcy of Islam and its 
national and cultural values to the Uzbek nation. Just as Soviet ideology had embraced the 
perception that groups with conflicting viewpoints were against the ‘nation’, ideology in 
post-independence Uzbekistan perceived groups that adhered to politicised and ‘foreign’ 
forms of Islam as threatening to the nation during a decisive period. Thus, the government’s 
embrace of a particularly local and spiritual form of Islam appears to highlight its 
commitment to national identity -  a fundamental source of legitimacy in the post-Soviet era. 
Undoubtedly, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the institutional frailties of the political 
marketplace, inherited from the Soviet era, enabled the Karimov regime to dominate the post-
independence political arena. However, the state’s domination - symbolised by its control of 
parliament, the media, absence of credible political alternatives, and the substantial 
concentration of power in the President’s office - did not generate complacency. Rather, the 
government recognised the centrality of national identity and consolidation to the state’s 
political agenda. This is reflected in the state’s policy vis a vis religion, where institutions 
such as the state-controlled Muslim Spiritual Board scrupulously monitored and outlawed 
Islamic practises that challenged the ‘traditions’ of the ‘nation’. In this regard, issues of 
security played a crucial role in the strengthening of the state and demonstrating its capacity 
in the post-Soviet era. With religious boundaries established during the nation-building 
process, ‘unofficial’ Islam and its perceived connections with trans-national terrorism 
provided the raison d’etre for its systematic persecution. Moreover, the attacks in Namangan 
and Tashkent and their ties to Wahhabis were presented as legitimising the regime’s 
viewpoint on ‘unofficial’ Islam, positioning the state and its security policy as the only viable 
means of protecting the ‘nation’. In addition, with the 1999 Moscow bombings and the 
September 11 attacks in the United States, the primacy of national security and the ‘war on 
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terror’ superseding other issues such as human rights and democracy represented a 
convenient way for Karimov to obtain international legitimacy and portray Uzbekistan as an 
ally of the international community. In the post-Soviet era, the nation-building and state-
building processes reflected the interplay between ideology and pragmatism and their role in 
preserving the status quo.  
In the case of Uzbekistan, the nation not only represented a modern construct, it also lent 
itself to manipulation by political elites in consolidating power. Further, by the millennium, 
the persecution of ‘bad’ Islam had resulted in the arrest, torture, and sentencing of thousands 
of Muslims. For Hobbes, the state depicts the ‘mortal god’ whose methods of coercion inflict 
social apprehension surrounding the prospect of lawlessness.
178
 Observing that no summum 
bonum or greatest good exists, it served humans better to be found inside a political 
community that imposed coercion and fear, as the only other alternative was anarchy.
179
 
Achieved through nation-building and state-building, and the role of religion in these 
overlapping processes, the return of the ‘leviathan’ epitomises the realisation of political 
survival in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. 
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